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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

an indefinite rule, based on varying facts and circumstances, which
would impair the certainty and security of land titles.'
Finally, social interest in family relations dictates a strict
adherence to the statute. One of the essential purposes of adoption laws is the protection of the child's welfare in securing a
proper home, suitable environment, and responsible parents." It
is submitted that equity, especially, has been too free to exercise
a dispensing power in the teeth of an express statute such as the
Statute of Frauds.1' It is submitted that the decision in the principal case is sound.
-CHARLES W. CALDWELL.
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CLIENT'S FuNDs - DISBARMENT. - In a civil action by notice of
motion to recover money wrongfully withheld by an attorney, a
verdict was returned for the plaintiff. The trial court upon its
own motion ordered and adjudged that the defendant be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and fined, and further ordered that the
defendant be disbarred, to which the defendant brings error.
2See Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 446, 68 At. 1038 (1908), where it
was said: "The personal attitude of the inmates of a family towards an
adopted child, as regards the family relation, is a matter entirely for the
parties. But the matter of inheritance is entirely under the regulation of
the law. The right to take property by devise or descent is the creation of
the law, and not a natural right."
"'The West Virginia statute, W. VA. REV. CODE (1931), c. 48, art. 4, §§
1-6, provides that it shall be necessary that a discreet and suitable person
be appointed to act as next friend of the child sought to be adopted, and
that he shall satisfy the court that the child's welfare would be promoted
by the adoption.
Apparently no case has come before the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, but the court has referred to the statute. In Riley v. Riley, 38
W. Va. 283, 287, 18 S. E. 569 (1893), there was an action for work and
labor by a nephew who has made his home with an uncle but never legally
adopted, and the court said: "he could have adopted his nephew, in which
case he (nephew) . . . . would have been invested with every legal right,
privilege, obligation and relation in respect to education, maintenance and
the right of inheritance in the estate of the adopting parent . . . . " See
also Burdette v. Insurance Co., 80 W. Va. 384, 93 S. E. 366 (1917).
1 In most of the states the adoption laws apply only to a child or minor
but in some the adoption of adults is provided for, as for instance in New
York, N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW, art. 7, § 110. It is suggested that such provisions are inimical to the public interest. The 'West Virginia statute refers
only to minors, however, it might be advisable to make an exception in be-

half of a person taken into the family when a child and continuously a
member of the household but never legally adopted.
would eliminate many of the hardship cases.

This sort of a provision
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Held: The judgment fining the attorney without conviction on
indictment and disbarring him was error. The court disavowed
any design to limit the power of the circuit court, in a proper
case, to strike an attorney's name from the roll, but decided that
since the disbarment was so interwoven by statutory mandate
with the trial courts judgment it too must be set aside. Hall v.
Eary.1
The misdemeanor referred to2 and the portion of the statute
under which the trial court judge acted, is criminal in nature,
punishable by indictment, and an action thereunder is barred by
the one year statute of limitations for misdemeanors.' Similarly
to criminal contempt proceedings, the offense charged cannot be
tried on the civil side of the court.'
The accused in such an
action is protected by the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination,' and is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The disbarment proceeding is said to be civil in its nature,"
or by some courts neither civil nor criminal but a proceeding sui
generis.8 . It is, however, well established that a court may summarily and upon its own motion strike the name of an attorney
from the roll,' and it is not necessary that such proceedings should
'170 S. E. 904 (W. Va. 1933).

2W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 30, art. 2, § 13, "and he shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and be fined not less than twenty or more than
five
hundred dollars."
8
State v. Locke, 73 W. Va. 713, at 717, 81 S. B. 401 (1914): "Whenever
the act or series of acts necessary to constitute a criminal withholding of
money collected by an attorney for his client have transpired, the crime is
complete and from that day the statute of limitations begins to run."
'State
v. Fredlock, 52 W. Va. 232, 43 S. E. 153 (1902).
2
Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, at 444, 31 S. Ct.
492 (1911): For notwithstanding the many elements of similarity in
procedure and in punishment Ein criminal and civil contempts] there are
some differences between the two classes of proceedings, which involve substantial rights and constitutional privileges; it is certain in proceedings for
criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and cannot be compelled to testify against
himself.
GU. S. v. Jose, 63 Fed. 951 (C. C. D. Wash. 1894); State v. Davis, 50 W.
Va. 100, 40 S. E. 331 (1901).
'Keithley v. Stevens, 238 Ill. 199, 89 N. E. 375 (1909).
'State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274 (1914). Cf. Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 :Ky. 93, at 106, 176 S. W. 948 (1915): Disbarment proceedings,
although classed as civil are nevertheless of a quasi criminal nature and the
respondent should be allowed to introduce evidence of his good character;
In re Spencer, 137 App. Div. 939, 122 N. Y. Supp. 190, at 194 (1910: A
proceeding to disbar must for the purpose of procuring evidence be treated as
a special proceeding, wherein the respondent cannot demand the right to be
confronted with the witness against him.
".Rz parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 S. Ct. 569 (1882); State v. McClaugherty,
33 W. Va. 250, 10 S. E. 470 (1889).
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be founded upon formal allegation,' provided the attorney accused
has had sufficient notice and an opportunity to defend.'
The
power to disbar is not limited to cases where the attorney has been
convicted of a criminal offense, nor is it limited necessarily to
The
acts of misconduct committed in a professional capacity.'
proceedings of disbarment is not for the purpose of punishment
but rather to preserve the courts of justice from the official
ministrations of persons unfit to practice in them. '
The wrongful withholding of a client's money is generally
considered grounds for disbarment or suspension, either at common law' or under the statutes.' The courts independently of
the statute may regulate the conduct of their officers and discipline
according to their discretion." Statutes providing for suspension
and disbarment of attorneys for such unprofessional conduct are
interpreted as not restricting the court's inherent power in this
respect.' Such provisions are usually construed as nonexelusiveP
"State v. Hays, 64 W. Va. 45, at 48, 61 S. E. 355 (1908).
"Formal
allegations and technical description of the misconduct charged are not
necessary; In re Lowenthal, 78 Cal. 427, 21 Pac. 7 (1889).
1 Holms v. Conway, 241 U. S. 624, 36 S. Ct. 681 (1915); Barnes v. Lyons,
187 Fed. 881, at 883 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911) "Before an attorney at law is
removed from his office by a court whether under a statute or in the exercise
of its inherent powers, he is entitled to have specific charges made against
him and to notice and an opportunity to be heard in defense, the usual
practice being to issue a rule upon him to show cause stating the substance
of the charges."
"Underwood v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. L. 32, 105 S. W. 151 (1907); In
re Radford, 168 Mich. 474, 134 N. W. 472 (1912).
13State v. McClaugherty, supra n. 9 at 258, ,. .. and when an attorney commits an act, whether in the discharge of his duties as such or not, showing
such a want of professional or personal honesty as renders him unworthy of
public confidence, it is not only the province, but the duty of the court, to
strike his name from the roll of its attorneys."
"Iz x parte Wall, supra n. 9. In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, at 147, 67 AtI.
497 (1907) The power to declare the forfeiture of an attorney's privilege
to practice is a summary one inherent in the courts and exists not to mete
out punishment to an offender, but that the administration of justice may
be safeguarded and the courts and the public protected from the misconduct
of those who are licensed to practice.
IPeople v. Storey, 265 Ill. 207, 106 N. E. 797 (1914).
"In re Maloney 35 N. D. 1, 145 N. W. 385 .(1915); W. VA. REV. CODE
(1931) c. 30, art. 2, § 14.
17State ex rel. Johnson v. Gebhardt, 87 Mo. App. 542 (1901), It is almost
universally held that the courts have an inherent power to disbar attorneys
and strike their names from the rolls independent of any statute on the subject, nor does the enumeration of statutory grounds for disbarment deprive
them of power to disbar for other causes.
118Co-onwealth v. Roe, 129 Ky. 650, at 657, 112 S. W. 683 (1908), "The
court independently of statute has the right to disbar its officers if the facts
of the case justify it."
"Lenihan v. Commonwealth, supra n. 8 at 591, where the statute provided
that an attorney may be disbarred. The court held this to be non-exclusive
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or merely declaratory of the common law.' Consequently it appears that the trial court in the principal case might have properly
disbarred the defendant without a prior conviction of a criminal
offense; but since the disbarment order was considered mandatory
and predicated upon the supposed misdemeanor, the reversal as
to this part of the order seems consistent with reason under the
extraordinary circumstances, and in no way precludes a disbarment proceeding independent of this action.

-W.

F. WuNscimm.

AmOPIANE
AS COMMON CARRIER- In the District Court the plaintiff
recovered a verdict against the defendant aeroplane corporation
for damages suffered by her through the death of her husband,
alleged to have been brought about by the negligence of the defendant. The defendant appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals
from this judgment claiming that it was not liable for damages
in excess of the amount stipulated in the passenger's ticket. Held:
Aeroplane carriers, like other common carriers, cannot limit their
legal liability for negligent injury of the passengers. Judgment
affirmed. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service Inc. 'v. Glose."
From the very infancy of aviation, writers have anticipated
the application of "common carrier" law to aeroplane transportation.2 But, even so, it does not appear that there have'been any
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States nor any Fed-

COMMON

LIMITATION

OF

CARRER -

LABILITY.

and the absence of other statutory causes of disbarment did not prevent
disbarment proceedings where the attorney was guilty of personal or professional misconduct. Contra: Kane v. Haywood, 66 N. C. 1 (1872). A.
statute has been held to restrict the powers of the judiciary as to punishment
and disbarment of attorneys, where it leaves no room for construction and
goes on with manifest intention to restrict. In re Eaton, 4 N. D. 514, 62
N. W. 597 (1895). Where a statute enumerates grounds for the disbarment
of an attorney no other grounds can be considered by the court. In re
Collins, 147 Cal. 8,81 Pac. 220 (1905).
coState v. Harber, 129 Mo. 314, 31 S.W. 889 (1895).
166 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
2"Doubtless the rules governing the business of a common carrier by
airship could be readily assimilated to most of those applied to other common carriers."
Moore, Agrial Navigation (1900) 4 LAw NOTES 87. See
also (1926) 20 ILL. L. REv. 511. A common carrier in the modern sense includes a carrier of passengers as well as one of goods. The carrier is not an
insurer but is bound to exercise care and diligence for safety of passengers.
Chaput v. Lussier, 165 Atl. 573 (Maine, 1933).
2 HUToHIsoN, Lw or
CARRIERS (3d ed. 1906) § 963.
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